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Bill Bowring is Professor of Law in the School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London
Improving Russia’s “Investment Climate”: Will the 
Latest Wave of Judicial Reform Succeed?
President Dmitry Medvedev appears perfectly to understand the crucial importance of judicial reform if Russia is to attract 
significant investment. On 4 February 2010, at a meeting to which I 
will refer further below, he said the following:
“… the investment climate in our country is directly dependent 
on the judicial system efficiency. Every time I meet with Russian 
entrepreneurs or foreign investors, they always say the same thing: 
if Russia is to have a first-class investment climate, the judicial 
system has to develop, mature and be able to effectively discharge 
its responsibilities.”
Since the early days of his Presidency, Medvedev has been highly 
critical of what he terms “legal nihilism” in Russia. On 10 September 
2009 in his unprecedented article published on the internet, entitled 
“Go Russia!”, Medvedev described Russian as having “a primitive 
economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption.” He promised 
“measures to strengthen the judiciary and fight corruption”, but also 
declared that “An effective judicial system cannot be imported.”
He then very specifically promised:
“Our judicial system must be a central component here. We have 
to create a modern efficient judiciary, acting in accordance with 
new legislation on the judicial system and based on contemporary 
legal principles. We also have to rid ourselves of the contempt for 
law and justice, which, as I’ve said repeatedly, has lamentably 
become a tradition in this country… We need to eliminate attempts 
to influence judicial decisions for whatever reasons. Ultimately, the 
judicial system itself has to understand the difference between what 
it means to act in the public interest or in the selfish interests of a 
corrupt bureaucrat or businessman… It is the job of the courts with 
broad public support to cleanse the country of corruption. This is 
a difficult task but it is doable. Other countries have succeeded in 
doing this”.
Those statements not only amount to a startling indictment of 
the present state of the judicial system in Russia, but highlight the 
crucial role of the judiciary in eliminating corruption and helping to 
modernise Russia.
The urgency of Medvedev’s call has been confirmed many times 
by those seeking to invest in Russia. In October 2009, Bill Browder, 
whose Hermitage Capital Management was one of the largest foreign 
portfolio investors in Russia by 2005, told an audience at Stanford 
University that “Anyone who would make a long-term investment in 
Russia right now, almost at any valuation, is completely out of their mind. 
My situation is not unusual. For every me, there are 100 others suffering in 
silence.” As if to confirm Browder’s fears, the Hermitage lawyer Sergey 
Magintsky, who, on Browder’s behalf, had been fighting corruption in 
Russia, died in custody in Moscow on 16 November 2009. As I show 
below, his death provoked a furious scandal in Russia and abroad.
The need for reform was highlighted in October 2009 with the 
publication of another report ordered by Institute of Contemporary 
Development (ICD) – President Medvedev is the Chairman of its Board 
of Trustees - and prepared by the Centre for Political Technology. This 
report is entitled “The Judicial System of Russia. The Fundamentals 
of the Problem.” The report was based on qualitative sociological 
research carried out in 2009, by means of expert interviews in several 
regions of Russia with judges and retired judges, advocates, academic 
lawyers, business people and NGOs.
The report concluded that the main problem for the judicial system 
in Russia is not its corruption, which does not exceed the level of 
corruption in Russian as a whole, but the high level of dependence 
of judges on government officials. The research showed cases which 
do not concern the interests of government bodies are decided 
objectively. But in the most significant cases judges protect the 
interests of the officials and not those who are actually in the right. 
A case decided in accordance with the law, but not in the interests 
of officials, will be overturned on appeal and returned for further 
consideration. And the more frequently judgments are overturned, 
the more grounds there will be for dismissing a judge who has simply 
decided according to law. Judges bear these unwritten rules in mind, 
and make their own conclusions as to which cases to decide according 
to law and which not.
The research revealed all the levers by means of which the dependence 
of judges is maintained within the system itself. The most important 
factor in the work of judges, the report says, is fear and dependence 
on the chairman of the court. The chairman of every court has 
powerful levers for putting pressure on judges. The chairman decides 
on the distribution of cases to particular judges, awards bonuses, and 
resolves the judges’ housing problems. The promotion of a judge is 
decided by the chairman, and the chairman may take disciplinary 
proceedings against a judge right through to the judge’s dismissal. 
At the same time, the chairman of any court in Russia is appointed 
and re-appointed by the President of the Russian Federation, which 
ensures the chairman’s dependence on the authorities. Thus, a rank 
and file judge when taking a decision must keep an eye on the court 
chairman, and the chairman in turn must correctly interpret signals 
from the Kremlin, the local administration, influential government 
officials, politicians and businessmen.
Thanks to these levers, government officials have at their disposal 
a “directed” court, which can be used in part as a disciplinary 
mechanism and as an instrument for advancing the interests of 
particular economic groups.
The report also contains statistical data showing that the rate of 
acquittal in non-jury cases is less than 1%. The judges themselves 
recognise that acquittals are reversed on appeal 30 times more 
often than convictions. This is why convictions predominate, and 
there is a fear of acquitting. The authors of the research conclude 
that the present position of judiciary may be improved by attracting 
competent professionals to the ranks of the judges, but it will not 
be possible to retain them. They also consider that the number of 
complaints to the European Court of Human Rights will continue to 
grow. They add that the contemporary Russian judicial system, as in 
the Soviet times, cannot lead to independent justice. This does not 
mean that every judicial decision is dictated by someone or other. It 
means that any decision in any case may be dictated.
It will be a complex task to reform the judicial system. According to 
Vyacheslav Lebedev, the long-serving Chairman of the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation, there are 25,000 judges of general 
jurisdiction in Russia, and in 2009 the President appointed altogether 
2000 new judges. In 2009 363 judges of general jurisdiction were on 
the instructions of their court chairman. Of them 61 were dismissed. 
A judge dismissed in this way also loses rights to compensation and 
to a pension. 302 judges received warnings, and nine were subjected 
to criminal proceedings, five of them for intentionally handing down 
grossly unjust decisions.
Lebedev also revealed that in 2009 there were 602 jury trials, 12% 
more than in 2008, and with an acquittal rate of 18.7%. However, 19% 
of acquittals were overturned on appeal. This must be set against 
the fact that in 2008 alone the courts of general jurisdiction heard 
13,400,000 civil cases, 1,100,000 criminal cases, and 5,682,000 cases 
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concerning administrative violations (misdemeanours).
Since October 2009, there have been two dramatic and positive 
developments. First, on 21 November 2009, the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation ruled that as a result of Russia’s signature of 
Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human rights (ECHR), and 
despite the fact that it has never ratified, Russia may not impose the 
death penalty. This was, effectively, abolition.
Second, on 15 January 2010 the State Duma finally voted to ratify 
Protocol 14 to the ECHR, on reform of the procedure of the Strasbourg 
Court, which Russia had signed in May 2006 and long delayed 
ratifying. The Federation Council voted in favour on 27 January, and 
President Medvedev signed the Law on Ratification on 4 February 
2010. Russia was the last of the Council of Europe’s 47 member states 
to do so.
Are these harbingers of real reform?
President Medvedev marked the occasion by inviting the heads 
of the highest courts in Russia – Valeriy Zorkin, Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court, Vyacheslav Lebedev, Chairman of the Supreme 
Court, and Anton Ivanov, Chairman of the Higher Arbitrazh Court 
– along with other senior officials from his Administration, to his 
residence at Gorky outside Moscow, where, as I noted above, he 
stressed the vital importance of judicial reform for Russia’s economic 
future. He also expressed the hope that as a result of his proposed 
reforms, Russians would be less likely to turn to the Strasbourg Court. 
The greatest number of applications, one quarter of the total, come 
from Russia – 11,000 in 2008 and 14,000 in 2009.
Also on 4 February 2010 Medvedev’s ICD published another report, 
entitled “21st-Century Russia: Reflections on an Attractive Tomorrow” 
signed by the influential commentators Igor Yurgens and Yevgeny 
Gontmakher. An article in the English-language Moscow Times 
reported many Russian commentators writing off the report as PR by 
Medvedev.
At the centre of its argument the report placed the necessity of judicial 
reform. This provoked a high degree of scepticism. Alla Ivanova in 
the Nezavisimaya Gazeta rejected the proposals as proposing the 
“Ukrainisation of the whole country” (a reference to Lenin’s vision of 
the “electrification of the USSR”). The sober business daily Vedomosti 
commented with a headline “Back to the future…” – a section of the 
report is entitled “Back – to the Constitution”, and in the view of the 
Vedomosti article many of the proposals appear to signal a return to 
Yeltsin’s policies.
This is not the first attempt at judicial reform since the collapse of 
Communism in 1991. The fall of the USSR was preceded by publication 
of the Conception of Judicial Reform published on 24 October 1991, 
and the enactment on 22 November 1991 of the Declaration of 
the Rights and Freedoms of the Person and Citizen by the Supreme 
Soviet of the RSFSR. The Constitutional Court, created as the USSR 
reached its death-throes, started work in January 1992, followed on 
26 June 1992 by enactment of the Law “On the Status of Judges of 
the Russian Federation”. On 16 July 1993, enactment of the new Part 
X to the Criminal Procedural Code (UPK) introduced jury trial, as an 
experiment, in nine Russian regions.
In a second wave of reform, President Putin from 2000 to 2003 
expressly referred to himself as following in the footsteps of the great 
reforming Tsar, Alexander II, and his law reforms of 1864. Putin too 
presided over creation of a system of justices of the peace; installation 
of jury trial throughout Russia with the exception of Chechnya; 
enhanced judicial status; and a much reduced role for the prosecutor 
in criminal and civil trials.
The reforms of 2001-2003 were driven through the Russian Parliament 
against strong opposition from the Prokuratura, and included the 
three new procedural codes enacted from 2001 to 2003, Criminal, 
Arbitrazh (Commercial), and Civil, as well as the radical improvements 
to Yeltsin’s Criminal Code of 1996, 257 amendments in all, which 
were enacted on 8 December 2003. However, this second phase of 
legal and judicial reform from 2000 came to an abrupt end in late 
2003, simultaneously with the arrest of Mr Khodorkovsky and the 
destruction of YUKOS.
What, then, of President Medvedev’s proposed reforms? Will they 
succeed where the two previous waves have manifestly failed?
On Friday 29 January 2010 the State Duma unanimously approved at 
first reading a package of laws to reform the judicial system, presented 
by Medvedev’s administration. The most important innovation is 
the abolition of the present appeal by way of cassation – appeal on 
a point of law, where success means a new trial in the first instance 
court. Instead there will be appeal by way of rehearing, where the 
appeal court will be able to render its own final decision. At present 
such appeal is only possible from the Justices of the Peace, the lowest 
level of the courts of general jurisdiction.
There are now five draft laws before the State Duma concerning 
judicial proceedings and the judicial system itself. According to the 
advocates from the leading law-firm Padva & Epshtein, as reported 
on the lawyers’ web-site Pravo.ru, the most important of these draft 
laws are:
1) Introduction of appeal by way of a new hearing leading to a 
new judgment, in civil cases in the courts of general jurisdiction. 
This will take the place of cassation leading in all cases to reference 
back to the lower court, and the possibility of supervisory review 
(nadzor), which can re-open a case long after a final judgment 
has been delivered. Supervisory review has been condemned by 
the European Court of Human Rights in a series of cases, since it 
violates the principle of legal certainty. Supervisory review will 
now be restricted to the very highest instance, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Court.
2) Amendments to the law governing the corporate bodies of 
judges, especially in the Supreme Court, strengthening the self-
organisation of the judges.
3) Changes to the procedure for subjecting judges to criminal 
investigation.
4) Changes to the laws on the system of judges of general 
jurisdiction, one of which is a Law of the Russian Socialist 
Federation of Soviet Republics of 1986. The objective of the 
changes is to strengthen and simplify the existing system, 
which will continue to have the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation at its head.
5) Amendments to the laws governing the Arbitrazh (Commercial) 
Court system in Russia, making possible a combined plenum of 
the Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitrazh Court. Thus, where 
a necessary a common position can be taken with regard to both 
the Arbitrazh Courts, and the Courts of General Jurisdiction.
The law introducing appeal by way of re-hearing will come into force 
on 1 January 2012.
Yuriy Nikolaev of Nikolaev & Partners took the view that in order to 
cure the judicial system, not only structural reforms will be needed, 
but the replacement of the majority of the present judges. It is a 
question of psychology, he said. If a person has been dependent all 
his life, he cannot take objective decisions. One whole generation of 
judges must be replaced. And Tamara Morshchakova, former Deputy 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court, and a formidable commentator, 
pointed out on Pravo.ru on 24 February 2010 that the task of reform is 
formidable. If a judge seeks to oppose the other state powers, she is 
simply “eaten up”. To this day, Russian judges are not separated from 
the other organs of state power, and judicial independence is simply 
not guaranteed. 
Are the proposed reforms simply PR by Medvedev? There are two 
recent comparators.
On 18 February 2010 President Medvedev announced what appeared 
to be a radical reform of the Ministry of the Interior (the police) sacking 
a number of generals and giving the Minister, Mr Nurgaliyev, one 
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month to come forward with radical plans. Many commentators were 
sceptical, seeing these actions as further evidence that Medvedev is 
escalating his pre-election campaign against Prime Minister Putin, 
and showing that it is he who controls the “force ministries”. And 
Ilya Barabanov, writing in “The New Times” on 22 February 2010, sees 
this as simply a “clean-up of uniforms”. Most of those dismissed were 
either about to retire or were the subject of scandals.
These changes for the police followed Medvedev’s appointment, on 
3 August 2009, of Aleksandr Reimer as head of Russia’s penitentiary 
system, FSIN. The death in detention of the lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy 
was followed by a series of dismissals, and on 19 February 2010 Mr 
Reimer used unprecedentedly strong language in summing up the 
results of 2009, accusing his subordinates of lack of system, sloppiness 
and slackness. But many of those dismissed were in fact reformers, 
who had made real progress in humanising the system.
In the not too distant future it will be possible to make a firm judgment 
as to whether Medvedev’s proposals are the genuine article, or simply 
an attempt to position himself to continue as President. ■
